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Introduction/Abstract	
	
In	a	series	of	publications,	L.	A.	Paul	has	defended	a	version	of	the	bundle	theory	according	
to	which	material	objects	are	nothing	but	mereological	sums	of	‘their’	properties.	This	
‘mereological’	bundle	theory	improves	in	important	ways	on	earlier	bundle	theories,	but	
here	I	present	a	new	argument	against	it.	The	argument	is	roughly	this:	1)	Material	objects	
occupy	space;	2)	even	if	properties	have	spatial	characteristics,	they	do	not	quite	occupy	
space;	3)	on	no	plausible	construal	of	mereological	composition	does	a	mereological	sum	of	
non-space-occupying	entities	occupy	space;	therefore,	4)	material	objects	are	not	
mereological	sums	of	properties.	
	
1 Mereological	Bundle	Theory	and	Its	Attractions	
	
The	more	you	examine	a	material	object,	such	as	a	table	or	a	flower,	the	more	properties	of	
it	you	come	to	know.	First	you	establish	that	the	table	is	brown,	rectangular,	four-legged,	
and	hard;	later	you	discover	that	it	is	made	of	cherry	wood,	weighs	53	kilos,	is	140	cm	
across,	is	manufactured	in	Taiwan,	and	is	more	precisely	sienna-brown;	ultimately	you	
might	learn	what	percentage	of	the	table	is	carbon,	oxygen,	hydrogen,	and	so	on,	what	the	
table’s	exact	mass	is,	and	the	like	‘scientific	properties.’	But	however	long	you	examine	the	
table,	you	will	never	detect	something	that	goes	beyond	the	table’s	properties,	say	a	bare	
substrate	that	‘supports’	the	properties.		
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	 According	to	the	bundle	theory	of	material	objects,	there	is	a	very	simple	reason	for	
this:	all	a	material	object	is	is	the	collection	of	its	properties.	Our	table	is	nothing	more	than	
a	bundle	of	table-y	properties.	Very	generically,	the	bundle	theory	says	this:	
(BUNDLE)		 For	any	material	object	O,	there	is	a	bundle	B	of	properties,	such	that	O	=	
B.		
(BUNDLE)	faces	a	number	of	immediate	challenges,	however.	One	way	to	bring	out	the	
attraction	of	mereological	bundle	theory,	as	developed	notably	by	L.	A.	Paul	(2002,	2006,	
2017a,	2017b),	is	to	consider	the	way	it	elegantly	responds	to	these	challenges.		
	 Perhaps	the	first	challenge	(BUNDLE)	faces	is	that	it	is	unclear	what	a	bundle	is.	It	is	
perhaps	most	natural	to	construe	bundles	as	sets.	However,	sets	are	typically	understood	as	
abstract	objects,	whereas	tables	are	concrete	(Hoffman	and	Rosenkrantz	1994:	61).	By	
Leibniz’s	Law,	O	cannot	be	identical	with	B	if	O	is	concrete	and	B	is	abstract.		
	 One	might	take	bundles	to	be	simply	pluralities.	On	this	construal,	what	the	table	is	
identical	to	is	just	the	table-y	properties	P1,	…Pn	‘taken	together.’	This	approach	faces	its	
own	embarrassment,	however,	insofar	as	it	involves	an	identity	on	one	side	of	which	is	a	
plurality	and	on	the	other	side	a	single	individual.	This	is	quite	puzzling:	again,	by	Leibniz’s	
Law,	we	might	expect	that	if	B	is	a	plurality	whereas	O	is	a	oneness,	then	B	≠	O.	Although	
there	are	certainly	live	approaches	to	many-one	identities	(see	Contoir	and	Baxter	2014),	it	
is	mutatis	mutandis	preferable	for	the	bundle	theory	if	it	can	avoid	getting	mired	in	this	
particular	can	of	worms.		
	 Mereological	bundle	theory	offers	a	simple	way	out,	construing	bundles	as	
mereological	sums.	Unlike	sets,	sums	are	not	by	nature	abstract;	on	the	contrary,	a	sum	of	
concreta	is	itself	concrete.	At	the	same	time,	the	sum	of	table-y	properties	is	one	whole:	the	
whole	is	one,	even	though	its	parts	are	many.	According	to	mereological	bundle	theory,	
then,	the	table’s	properties	are	parts	of	the	table,	and	the	table	is	the	(one)	whole	which	
they	jointly	compose.		
	 Peter	Simons	(1994:	563)	has	argued	that	if	you	break	down	an	airplane	to	its	
various	parts,	you	do	not	find	its	weight	among	them.	As	an	objection	to	mereological	
bundle	theory	this	would	misfire,	though,	insofar	as	it	presupposes	that	the	airplane’s	only	
parts	are	spatial	parts.	In	Paul’s	mereological	bundle	theory,	the	table’s	properties	are	
neither	spatial	nor	temporal	parts	of	the	table,	but	what	Paul	(2002)	calls	logical	parts	
(Paul	2002).	The	notion	of	logical	part	certainly	calls	for	elucidation,	but	one	way	to	
characterize	logical	parthood	is	in	terms	of	the	mereological	axioms	that	govern	its	
behavior	(see	Paul	2002:	585).	
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	 A	second	challenge	(BUNDLE)	faces	concerns	arbitrarily	bundled	properties.	Imagine	
a	world	with	only	two	tables:	one	brown	and	rectangular,	the	other	beige	and	round.	
Intuitively,	the	bundles	comprising	(i)	brownness	and	rectangularity	and	(ii)	beigeness	and	
roundness	correspond	to	material	objects,	whereas	the	bundles	comprising	(iii)	brownness	
and	roundness	and	(iv)	beigeness	and	rectangularity	do	not.	But	what	separates	the	former	
pair	from	the	latter?		
	 In	addressing	this	challenge,	one’s	first	instinct	is	to	require	that	the	properties	be	
‘co-instantiated.’	The	problem	here	is	that	‘co-instantiated’	seems	to	mean	‘instantiated	by	
the	same	object,’	which	presupposes	that	we	already	have	objects.	More	commonly,	bundle	
theorists	identify	objects	with	bundles	of	compresent	(i.e.,	collocated)	properties	(Russell	
1950:	128).	But	this	has	its	own	cost,	insofar	as	‘compresent’	seems	to	mean	‘present	in	the	
same	location,’	which	presupposes	that	we	can	identify	locations	independently	of	objects	–	
something	that	relationalist	about	space	will	deny.	(It	would	be	a	shame	if	bundle	theory	
were	viable	only	for	philosophers	who	reject	relationalism.)	
The	mereological	bundle	theorist	has	a	much	more	straightforward	response	to	
offer,	namely,	restricted	composition	of	properties.	It	is	true	that	in	Classical	Mereology	
composition	is	unrestricted,	such	that	for	any	plurality	of	xs,	there	is	a	sum	that	the	xs	
compose.	But	non-classical	mereologies	that	do	not	include	the	axiom	of	unrestricted	
composition	are	available	as	well,	and	so	mereological	bundle	theory	may	avail	itself	of	one	
of	them.	It	is	important	in	this	context	to	underline	a	distinction	between	pure	and	applied	
mereology.	The	pure/applied	distinction	is	familiar	from	mathematics:	all	consistent	and	
complete	mathematical	systems	are	equally	good	from	the	‘pure’	standpoint,	but	only	some	
of	them	actually	apply	to	–	i.e.,	accurately	describe	–	worldly	phenomena.	Euclidean	
geometry	and	Riemannian	geometry	are	equally	good	as	purely	formal	systems,	but	only	
the	latter	describes	the	spatial	structure	of	the	world.	Likewise,	although	many	purely	
formal	mereological	systems	are	possible,	the	mereological	bundle	theorist	might	insist	
that	only	those	with	restricted	composition	of	properties	describe	the	compositional	
structure	of	objects	–	as	far	as	their	logical	composition	from	properties	is	concerned.	The	
bundle	theorist	can	of	course	allow	that	composition	of	objects	is	unrestricted,	as	long	as	
the	composition	of	properties	is	restricted.		
There	is	an	independent	question,	of	course,	as	to	what	principles	govern	–	restrict	–	
the	composition	of	properties.	A	fully	developed	mereological	bundle	theory	would	have	to	
include	a	story	about	this.	But	as	Paul	(2017a:	39)	points	out,	one	option	–	her	favorite	–	is	
to	embrace	‘brutal	composition’	of	properties.	Because	it	has	proven	difficult	to	find	a	
principled	way	to	draw	the	distinction	between	sum-composing	pluralities	and	non-sum-
composing	ones	(Van	Inwagen	1990),	one	option	in	the	extant	literature	has	been	
primitivism	about	composition:	it	is	a	brute	fact	that	these	pluralities	over	here	compose	a	
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sum	and	those	over	there	do	not	(Markosian	1998).	This	kind	of	brutal	composition	can	be	
recruited	by	the	bundle	theorist,	especially	given	that	some	prominent	traditional	bundle	
theorists	held	anyway	that	the	privileged	relation	that	distinguishes	object-constituting	
bundles	from	non-object-constituting	ones	is	primitive	(Goodman	1951).	
	 A	last	major	bundle-theoretic	challenge	worth	discussing	here	is	Max	Black’s	(1952)	
two-sphere	case.	There	is	a	possible	world	in	which	there	are	only	two	material	objects	–	
two	qualitatively	indistinguishable	spheres	that	persist	from	the	beginning	of	the	world	to	
its	end.	In	fact,	there	are	many	such	possible	worlds.	In	some	of	them,	space	might	be	
absolute,	so	that	the	two	spheres	actually	have	different	spatial	properties:	one	sphere	is	
located	in	L1	whereas	the	other	is	located	in	L2.	But	unless	it	is	a	necessary	truth	that	space	
is	absolute,	in	some	two-sphere	worlds	space	is	relational,	so	that	the	spatial	properties	
(including	relational	spatial	properties)	of	each	sphere	mirror	those	of	the	other.	In	those	
worlds,	the	two	spheres	would	appear	to	have	the	exact	same	properties.	Accordingly,	
there	is	only	one	bundle	of	properties	in	them,	albeit	two	material	objects.	And	this	seems	
to	suggest	that	neither	object	can	really	be	nothing	but	that	bundle	of	properties.	
	 The	extant	literature	contains	a	number	of	responses,	including	that	the	relevant	
worlds	–	at	least	as	described	–	are	not	really	possible	(O’Leary-Hawthorne	1995).	But	a	
safer	response,	respecting	the	apparent	possibility	of	the	relevant	worlds,	distinguishes	the	
two	spheres	by	construing	the	properties	being	bundled	as	so-called	tropes.	Traditionally,	
properties	have	been	construed	either	as	in	re	universals,	that	is,	entities	which	can	be	
wholly	present	in	different	places	at	the	same	time;	or	as	ante	rem	universals,	that	is,	
entities	not	present	in	any	place	and	either	not	present	at	any	time	or	present	at	all	times.1	
A	trope	construal	casts	properties	as	‘individual	accidents’	or	‘abstract	particulars’	
(Williams	1953):	entities	such	as	this	desk’s	roundness,	that	table’s	woodenness,	and	
yonder	flower’s	pinkness,	which	are	each	present	in	only	one	place	at	a	time.	
Corresponding	to	these	three	construals	of	properties	are	three	different	kinds	of	bundle	
theory,	identifying	objects	with	bundles	of	ante	rem	universals,	bundles	of	in	re	universals,	
or	bundles	of	tropes.	Mereological	bundle	theory	does	not	as	such	have	to	commit	to	any	
one	of	these.	However,	a	mereological	trope	bundle	theory	will	diffuse	the	two-sphere	
problem	most	straightforwardly,	since	corresponding	to	the	two	spheres	are	two	bundles	
of	numerically	distinct	tropes:	two	sphericality	tropes,	two	grayness	tropes,	and	so	on	(see	
Campbell	1981:	482-3).		
	 In	its	bid	to	expel	material	objects	from	the	fundamental	furniture	of	the	world,	
assaying	them	instead	as	derivative	upon	properties,	bundle	theory	belongs	to	a	long	
ontological	tradition	of	trying	to	shrink	as	much	as	possible	the	minimal	base	of	reality.	Its	
own	history	is	illustrious,	going	back	at	least	to	Porphyry’s	Isagoge	in	the	third	century,	
with	its	first	trope	version	showing	up	in	the	twelfth-century	scholastic	logician	Gilbert	of	
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Poitiers’	work	(Erismann	2014).	Arguably,	however,	it	is	the	recently	developed	
mereological	version	of	the	theory	that	is	most	promising.	Nonetheless,	I	will	now	argue,	it	
faces	a	major	challenge,	to	which	no	comfortable	response	is	available.	In	the	next	section,	I	
will	present	my	basic	argument	against	mereological	bundle	theory.	In	the	subsequent	
sections,	I	will	defend	the	argument’s	central	premises.		
	
2 The	Space-Occupation	Argument		
	
One	recurring	but	somewhat	impressionistic	complaint	against	bundle	theory	is	that	a	
collection	of	properties	just	does	not	seem	‘substantial	enough’	to	make	up	a	material	
object	(cf.	Paul	2017a:	34).	The	thingy-ness	of	the	object	seems	lost,	so	to	speak.	Now,	put	
this	way,	the	bundle	theorist	is	entitled	to	reject	the	complaint	as	question-begging.	The	
bundle	theory	just	is	the	theory	that	a	corporeal	substance	is	a	collection	of	properties;	
simply	asserting	that,	no,	a	collection	of	properties	is	not	corporeal,	or	not	substantial,	does	
not	constitute	new	input	to	the	dialectic.		
	 The	complaint,	or	one	very	like	it,	may	however	admit	of	a	less	question-begging	
articulation.	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	to	present	such	an	articulation.	The	resulting	
argument	is	roughly	this:	1)	Material	objects	occupy	space;	2)	properties	do	not	occupy	
space;	3)	mereological	sums	of	non-space-occupying	entities	do	not	occupy	space;	
therefore,	4)	material	objects	are	not	mereological	sums	of	properties.	
ge	
Material	objects	are	concrete	particulars.	Their	particularity	consists	in	the	fact	that	they	
can	be	wholly	present	in	only	one	place	at	a	time.	What	their	concreteness	consists	in	is	a	
more	controversial	affair.	Although	the	notion	of	concreteness	is	not	my	direct	concern	
here,	reflection	on	the	fact	that	material	objects	are	paradigmatically	concrete	entities	is	
helpful	in	introducing	the	notion	that	does	concern	me	–	namely,	that	material	objects	
occupy	space.		
Material	objects	have	spatiotemporal	properties,	and	this	may	be	thought	to	
constitute	their	concreteness.	This	is	problematic,	however:	Chess	was	invented	in	India	
(spatial	property)	in	the	6th	century	(temporal	property),	yet	intuitively,	chess	–	not	this	or	
that	specific	chess	set,	but	chess	as	such	–	is	an	abstract	entity	(Rosen	2017).		
It	might	be	suggested	that	concreta	are	distinguished	from	abstracta	in	having	not	
just	spatiotemporal	properties,	but	spatiotemporal	locations.	Intuitively,	however,	tropes	
have	locations	too,	despite	being	abstract	particulars	(hence	not	concrete	particulars).	
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What	trope	theorists	have	often	suggested	is	that	tropes	are	abstract	because	there	can	be	
many	of	them	in	the	same	place	at	the	same	time	–	they	do	not	‘exclude	each	other’	from	
the	same	space	(e.g.,	the	desk’s	brownness,	its	rectangularity,	and	its	solidity	are	all	in	L).2	
In	contrast,	the	desk	itself	is	concrete,	in	that	it	cannot	be	in	the	same	place	as	the	chair	or	
the	computer	at	the	very	same	time	–	these	do	‘exclude	each	other.’	Concreta,	on	this	view,	
are	those	entities	of	which	there	can	be	only	one	in	a	place	at	a	time.		
The	problem	with	this	approach	is	that	it	is	incompatible	with	the	(rather	common)	
view	that	a	material	object	and	its	matter	are	not	identical,	despite	being	perfectly	
collocated	(see	Baker	1997	and	Fine	2003	among	many	others).	On	the	assumption	that	
both	the	material	object	and	its	matter	(e.g.,	both	the	statue	and	the	lump	of	clay	of	which	it	
is	made)	are	concrete,	concreta	can	be	collocated	–	i.e.,	located	in	the	same	spatial	region	at	
the	same	time	–	and	thus	fail	to	‘exclude	each	other.’	This	is	not	a	problem	for	‘one-thingists’	
about	the	statue	and	the	clay,	of	course.	Nonetheless,	‘two-thingists’	can	coherently	claim	
that	both	the	statue	and	the	clay	are	concrete	entities,	and	this	means	there	must	be	some	
other	notion	of	concreteness	they	are	working	with.	
What	underlies	the	intuition	that	both	the	statue	and	the	clay-lump	are	concrete,	
even	if	they	fail	to	‘exclude	each	other’	spatially?	I	suggest	that	it	is	the	fact	that	each	
occupies	a	portion	of	space.	It	is	okay	for	two	concrete	entities	to	occupy	the	same	region	of	
space,	so	long	as	each	occupies	some	region	of	space.	What	underlies	this	conception	of	
concreteness	is	the	idea	that	a	concrete	entity	is	not	only	located	at	a	region,	but	occupies	it.	
A	statue	does	not	only	allow	us	to	locate	it	through	coordinates	in	space,	it	fills	up	the	space	
delimited	by	those	coordinates.	Moreover,	I	would	suggest,	it	is	precisely	because	tropes,	
although	located	in	space,	do	not	occupy	space,	that	we	take	tropes	to	be	abstract	rather	
than	concrete	particulars.		
What	does	it	mean	to	“occupy”	a	region?	We	can	obtain	an	initial	grasp	of	this	notion	
by	contrasting	material	objects	with	such	particulars	as	tropes,	states	of	affairs,	and	events.	
We	are	comfortable	saying	that	the	desk’s	trope	of	costing	$70	plus	tax	is	located	where	the	
table	is,	but	it	feels	odd	to	say	that	the	table’s	costing-$70-plus-tax	trope	occupies	the	space	
occupied	by	the	table.	Ditto	for	the	state	of	affairs	of	the	statue’s	costing	$70	and	the	event	
of	the	statue	being	sold	for	$70.	This	is	related	to	the	fact	that	the	statue	is	something	you	
can	grab	with	your	hands	and	move	from	one	region	to	another,	whereas	it	is	impossible	to	
grab	in	one’s	hands	a	state	of	affairs,	an	event,	or	a	trope	–	except,	of	course,	by	grabbing	
the	associated	material	object.	States	of	affairs,	events,	and	tropes	are	all	particulars,	and	
accordingly	have	a	location.	But	they	differ	importantly	from	material	objects	in	their	mode	
of	being,	insofar	as	they	do	not	occupy	the	region	at	which	they	are	located.	This	difference	
is	captured	by	the	conception	of	concreteness	under	consideration.		
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Offering	a	theoretical	analysis	of	the	occupation	relation	is	a	trickier	issue.	It	is	
important	to	me	to	insulate	the	argument	to	follow	from	the	dialectical	vicissitudes	likely	to	
attend	any	specific	analysis	of	the	sort.	But	the	following	is	clearly	a	central	feature	of	
space-occupying	entities:	every	spatial	proper	part	of	the	region	occupied	by	the	entity	is	
occupied	by	some	spatial	proper	part	of	the	entity.	If	a	$70	statue	occupies	region	R,	and	P	
is	a	spatial	proper	part	of	R,	then	the	statue	has	a	spatial	proper	part	that	occupies	P.	(Note	
well:	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	statue	must	have	a	physical	part	that	occupies	P!	A	statue	
has	many	tiny	empty	spaces	inside	it	–	‘empty’	in	the	sense	that	no	physical	object	occupies	
them	–	but	these	are	still	parts	of	the	statue,	i.e.,	spatial	parts.)	Obviously,	this	is	the	case	
also	for	any	material	object	collocated	with	the	statue,	such	as	the	clay-lump,	and	is	also	the	
case	with	extended	simples,	if	such	there	be:	an	extended	simple	has	no	physical	parts	but,	
being	extended,	certainly	has	spatial	parts.	In	contrast,	the	same	is	not	true	of	the	statue’s	
trope	of	costing	$70:	even	if	the	trope	is	located	in	R,	and	therefore	also	in	P,	there	does	not	
seem	to	be	a	spatial	proper	part	of	the	trope	that	is	located	exactly	in	P.	Similar	comments	
can	be	made	about	states	of	affairs	and	events.		
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It	follows	from	what	has	been	said	so	far	that	unlike	tropes	as	standardly	construed,	it	is	
essential	to	material	objects	such	as	tables,	statues,	and	lumps	of	clay	that	they	occupy	
space.	No	material	object	can	exist	without	occupying	some	portion	of	space	–	indeed,	it	
may	belong	to	the	very	mode	of	being	of	material	objects	that	they	occupy	space.		
If	one	thing	that	distinguishes	tropes	from	material	objects	is	that	material	objects	
occupy	space	whereas	tropes	do	not,	then	it	is	hard	to	see	how	any	mereological	sum	of	
tropes	could	amount	to	a	material	object.	When	you	put	together	four	entities,	each	of	
which	with	a	volume	of	one	meter	cube,	you	may	produce	a	bigger	entity	whose	volume	is	
four	meters	cube.	But	if	you	put	together	four	entities	that	do	not	have	any	volume,	you	
have	not	started	to	make	progress	toward	producing	any	entity	with	nonzero	volume.	Here,	
then,	is	a	first	anti-bundle	argument:		
1) Material	objects	occupy	space;	
2) Tropes	do	not	occupy	space;	
3) A	mereological	sum	of	entities	that	do	not	occupy	space	does	not	occupy	space;	
therefore,	
4) Mereological	sums	of	tropes	are	not	material	objects.		
This	argument	bears	two	significant	improvements.		
	 First,	if	tropes	do	not	occupy	space,	then	plausibly	universals	do	not	either.	This	is	
obviously	the	case	with	ante	rem	universals,	which	are	by	definition	altogether	a-spatial.	
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But	as	I	will	argue	in	§3,	it	is	also	true	of	in	re	universals.	So	Premise	2	can	be	generalized	to	
all	properties	however	construed.		
	 Secondly,	the	premises	above	are	stated	as	generics.3	But	if	we	opt	for	a	more	
precise	formulation	featuring	quantifiers,	we	gain	another	degree	of	freedom:	since	the	
denial	of	(BUNDLE)	is	a	mere	existential,	we	can	profitably	demote	Premise	1	to	an	
existential,	namely,	that	at	least	some	material	objects	occupy	space.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	
only	reasonable	way	to	deny	this	premise	is	by	denying	that	there	are	material	objects.	
That	would	be	true	either	if	there	were	no	objects	at	all	or	if	there	were	only	immaterial	
objects.	Perhaps	one	of	these	claims	could	be	defended	(some	ontic	structural	realists	
defend	the	first,	Berkeleyan	idealists	defend	the	second).	But	accepting	either	would	only	
mean	that	the	bundle	theory	of	material	objects	has	no	subject	matter	–	there	is	nothing	it	is	
a	theory	of.	The	aim	of	my	argument,	however,	is	to	show	that	even	if	the	bundle	theory	of	
material	objects	has	a	subject	matter,	it	cannot	be	a	correct	theory	of	it.	(Either	way,	the	
upshot	would	be	that	there	is	nothing	of	which	the	bundle	theory	is	true.)	
	 Combining	these	two	improvements,	we	obtain	the	following	anti-bundle	argument:		
1) Some	material	objects	occupy	space;	
2) No	properties	occupy	space;	
3) No	sum	of	entities	that	do	not	occupy	space	occupies	space;	therefore,	
4) Some	material	objects	are	not	sums	of	properties.		
Call	this	the	space-occupation	argument.	One	may	offer	the	space-occupation	argument	as	a	
way	to	‘dress	up	in	words’	the	pretheoretic	intuition	that	collections	of	properties	are	not	
‘substantial	enough’	to	constitute	a	material	object.	But	the	argument	has	whatever	force	it	
has	regardless	of	whether	it	captures	accurately	that	intuition.4		
	 It	is	important	to	distinguish	the	space-occupation	argument	from	a	nearby	
argument	that	would	be	a	simple	instance	of	the	fallacy	of	composition.	Thus,	the	following	
is	clearly	fallacious:	
1) Some	tables	are	visible;	
2) No	particle	is	visible;	therefore,		
3) Some	tables	are	not	sums	of	particles.	
This	is	clearly	a	fallacious	argument,	and	so	would	this	be:	
1) Some	material	objects	occupy	space;	
2) No	properties	occupy	space;	therefore,		
3) Some	material	objects	are	not	sums	of	properties.	
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But	the	space-occupation	argument	is	of	course	very	different	from	this	last	argument	–	it	
contains	an	extra	premise,	to	the	effect	that	no	sum	of	entities	that	do	not	occupy	space	
occupies	space.	This	renders	it	perfectly	valid.	Indeed,	the	following	is	also	a	perfectly	valid	
argument:	
1) Some	tables	are	visible;	
2) No	particle	is	visible;		
3) No	sum	of	entities	which	are	invisible	can	be	visible;	therefore,		
4) Some	tables	are	not	sums	of	particles.	
There	is	no	fallacy	in	this	argument,	of	composition	or	otherwise.	The	only	problem	with	it	
is	that	it	contains	a	manifestly	false	premise	–	the	third.	But	as	I	argue	in	§4,	the	
corresponding	premise	in	the	space-occupation	argument	–	that	no	sum	of	entities	that	do	
not	occupy	space	occupies	space	–	is	highly	plausible.		
The	remainder	of	this	paper	offers	a	sustained	defense	of	the	argument’s	premises:	
of	Premise	2	in	§3	and	Premise	3	in	§4.	I	do	not	pursue	a	defense	of	Premise	1	(i.e.,	that	
some	material	objects	occupy	space),	since	as	noted	the	only	reasonable	way	to	deny	it	is	
by	denying	that	the	bundle	theory	of	material	objects	has	a	subject	matter.	
	
3 Space-Occupying	Properties?		
	
In	this	section,	I	consider	the	mereological	bundle	theorist’s	options	for	denying	that	
properties	do	not	occupy	space.	This	would	probably	be	Paul’s	approach	to	the	space-
occupation	argument.	In	general,	it	is	Paul’s	consistent	aim	to	reject	any	ultimate	object-
property	dichotomy,	that	is,	to	collapse	the	distinction	between	objects	and	properties,	
identifying	a	single	nature	shared	by	both	(i)	the	kinds	of	entities	philosophers	traditionally	
consider	to	be	objects	and	(ii)	those	they	traditionally	consider	to	be	properties.	If	objects	
and	properties	have	a	single	nature,	there	should	be	no	obstacle	to	‘generating’	the	former	
by	summing	the	latter.		
The	issue,	from	our	perspective,	is	whether	this	can	really	be	done.	If	it	is	true	that	
objects	occupy	space	whereas	properties,	although	located	in	space,	do	not	occupy	it,	then	
this	would	appear	to	constitute	an	obstacle	to	collapsing	the	object-property	distinction	
and	generating	objects	from	properties.5	It	is	thus	natural	for	the	mereological	bundle	
theorist	to	seek	an	account	of	properties	as	occupying	space	after	all.	In	this	section,	I	
consider	first	the	prospects	for	space-occupying	tropes,	then	the	prospects	for	space-
occupying	universals.	
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It	might	be	suggested	that	all	a	bundle	theorist	needs,	in	order	to	ensure	that	a	
bundle	of	properties	occupies	space,	is	the	claim	that	one	of	the	properties	therein	bundled	
is	the	property	of	occupying	space.	However,	this	faces	the	following	dilemma:	does	the	
property	of	occupying	space	occupy	space	or	not?	If	it	does	not	occupy	space,	it	is	unclear	
how	merely	bundling	it	with	other	entities	which	do	not	occupy	space	could	make	it	the	
case	that	the	bundle	occupies	space.	It	must	be	part	of	the	suggestion,	then,	that	the	
property	of	occupying	space	occupies	space.	We	must	realize,	though,	that	this	in	no	way	
falls	out	of	the	nature	of	the	property.	The	nature	of	the	property	of	being	blue	is	not	that	it	
is	blue;	indeed,	on	most	views	properties	are	colorless.	What	the	nature	of	the	property	of	
being	blue	is	is	that	whatever	instantiates	it	is	blue.	Because	an	object	has	the	property,	the	
object	is	blue	–	whether	or	not	the	property	is.	Given	this,	to	claim	that	the	property	of	
occupying	space	occupies	space,	the	bundle	theorist	would	have	to	argue	that	the	property	
of	occupying	space	self-instantiates.	But	this	is	perplexing	at	many	levels.	Properties	do	not	
in	general	self-instantiate	(pace	Giberman	2014:	456-7).	A	table’s	property	of	costing	$70-
plus-tax	does	not	itself	cost	$70.	In	our	formal	economy	there	is	no	recognized	way	to	
purchase	properties,	however	construed	(except	perhaps	when	bundled).	So	there	would	
have	to	be	some	special	reason	why	the	space-occupation	property	has	this	peculiarity	that	
only	it	is	self-instantiating.		
The	better	option,	it	would	seem,	is	to	hold	that	all	properties,	by	their	nature,	
instantiate	the	property	of	occupying	space	–	that	is,	that	properties	are	in	fact	space-
occupying	entities.	Some	trope	theorists	seem	to	construe	tropes	in	a	way	that	suggests	
they	very	much	occupy	space.	This	is	perhaps	most	explicit	in	Keith	Campbell’s	work:6		
Form	and	volume	are	not	tropes	like	any	others.	Their	presence	in	any	particular	sum	of	tropes	is	not	
an	optional,	contingent,	matter…	Form	[i.e.,	shape]	and	volume	are	therefore	best	considered	not	as	
tropes	in	their	own	right	at	all.	Real	tropes	are	qualities-of-a-formed-volume.	The	distinctions	we	can	
make	between	color,	shape,	and	size	are	distinctions	in	thought	to	which	correspond	no	distinctions	
in	reality.	(Campbell	1981:	486)	
This	approach	does	not	treat	an	object’s	volume	as	a	trope	among	others,	but	instead	
considers	volume	an	aspect	or	dimension	of	every	trope.	The	table’s	brownness	trope	is	a	
brown	table-shaped	volume;	the	table’s	solidity	trope	is	a	solid	table-shaped	volume;	the	
table’s	53k-weight	trope	is	a	53k	table-shaped	volume;	and	so	on.		
It	is	questionable	whether	Campbell-style	voluminous	tropes	–	call	them	v-tropes	–	
have	what	it	takes	to	‘make	up’	material	objects.	If	a	blue	balloon	is	being	inflated,	we	
would	like	to	say	that	there	is	a	single	material	object	that	expands.	If	this	material	object	is	
partially	constituted	by	a	blueness	trope,	then	we	should	be	able	to	say	that	that	blueness	
trope	expands.	But	since	volume	is	essential	to	v-tropes’	identity	conditions,	we	must	see	
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the	inflation	instead	as	a	process	of	continuous	destruction	and	replacement	of	an	infinite	
series	of	instantaneous	blueness	tropes.		
	 More	importantly,	it	seems	to	me	that	depending	on	how	v-tropes	are	exactly	
construed,	they	are	either	concrete	particulars	or	not	really	intelligible.	To	see	why,	
consider	a	solid	brown	round	table.	Its	solidity	trope	is	a	solid	table-shaped	volume,	
according	to	Campbell.	Let	us	now	ask:	What	is	this	v-trope’s	color?	Two	potential	answers	
present	themselves:	either	(a)	the	solidity	v-trope	is	brown	or	(b)	it	is	colorless.7	Both	
answers	are	highly	problematic,	however.		
It	is,	in	truth,	quite	hard	to	see	how	the	solidity	v-trope	could	be	colorless.	The	
solidity	v-trope,	on	the	present	conception,	is	a	certain	volume	of	space,	and	volumes	of	
space	are	the	kinds	of	thing	where	color	properties	are	instantiated.	They	are	colorful	
things.	Indeed,	as	we	look	in	good	lighting	at	the	relevant	table-shaped	volume	of	space,	the	
visual	experience	we	enjoy	is	as	of	brown.	What	could	be	meant	by	the	claim	that	this	
volume	is	colorless	despite	the	testimony	of	our	eyes?	I	think	the	idea	must	be	that	just	as	
the	statue	and	the	clay	are	collocated	but	distinct,	the	solid	table-shaped	volume	and	the	
brown	table-shaped	volume	are	collocated	but	distinct;	and	because	they	are	distinct	the	
solid	table-shaped	volume	is	not	itself	brown.	But	while	it	seems	coherent	to	say	that	there	
are	two	distinct	objects	collocated	in	the	same	volume	of	space,	it	is	of	questionable	
coherence	to	say	that	there	are	two	distinct	volumes	of	space	in	the	same	.	.	.	what?	It	is	
important	to	appreciate	the	difference	between	embracing	co-occupation	of	regions	of	
space	and	embracing	a	kind	of	doubling	of	space	itself.	It	is	the	latter	that	seems	to	be	
presupposed	by	the	notion	that	the	solidity	table-shaped	volume	is	not	brown.	
Suppose,	then,	that	the	solidity	v-trope	is	brown.	Then	it	would	seem	that	the	trope	
under	discussion	is	not	really	a	solidity	trope	but	a	solidity-cum-brownness	trope.	Next,	
though,	we	will	ask	whether	this	solidity-cum-brownness	trope	is	round	or	shapeless,	and	
if	the	answer	is	again	that	it	is	round,	then	in	truth	this	is	a	solidity-cum-brownness-cum-
roundness	trope.	The	process	will	continue	until	we	end	up	with	a	single	v-trope	for	the	
whole	table:	a	volume	of	space	which	is	solid,	brown,	round,	…	[insert	all	other	properties	
of	the	table].	At	this	point,	though,	the	theory	is	no	longer	a	bundle	theory,	but	a	theory	
proposing	a	specific	ontological	assay	of	familiar	material	objects,	namely,	that	they	are	
variously-qualified	volumes	of	space.		
Might	the	v-trope	theorist	resist	this	by	claiming	that	the	solidity	v-trope	is	
essentially	solid	and	only	accidentally	brown	and	round,	whereas	the	brownness	v-trope	is	
essentially	brown	and	only	accidentally	solid	and	round?	This	would	maintain	the	plurality	
of	distinct	v-tropes,	which	could	then	be	mereologically	bundled	into	a	material	object.	
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However,	in	this	conception	it	is	no	longer	clear	why	v-tropes	are	not	themselves	
material	objects.	Just	like	the	table	itself,	the	solid	table-shaped	volume	has	determinate	
color,	determinate	weight,	and	more	generally	is	qualitatively	fully	determinate.	At	the	
same	time,	it	occupies	space	and	can	be	wholly	present	in	only	one	place	at	a	time.	In	this	
scenario,	the	solid	table-shaped	volume	and	the	brown	table-shaped	volume	are	
qualitatively	indistinguishable	and	differ	only	in	which	qualities	are	essential	to	them.	In	
this	respect	they	are	rather	like	the	statue	and	the	clay-lump:	two	fully	qualitatively	
determinate	space-occupants	that	happen	to	coincide	in	space	but	have	different	essential	
properties	(e.g.,	the	statue	is	essentially	goat-shaped,	whereas	the	clay	is	only	accidentally	
so).	As	we	have	seen,	though,	the	statue	and	the	clay-lump	are	collocated	material	objects,	
and	it	would	seem	we	should	say	the	same	of	the	solidity	v-trope	and	brownness	v-trope:	
they	are	collocated	material	objects.			
(To	be	sure,	in	the	present	conception	there	is	a	plenitude	of	coinciding	v-tropes	–	
perhaps	one	for	every	possible	distribution	of	essentiality	and	accidentality	across	the	
qualities	instantiated	in	any	given	volume.	But	this	kind	of	plenitude	can	be	applied	to	
concrete	objects	themselves	and	in	fact	has	been	recently	argued	to	effectively	be	implied	
by	any	kind	of	statue-clay	pluralism	–	see	Bennett	2004,	Leslie	2011,	and	Fairchild	2019	
inter	alia.)	
If	tropes	are	material	objects,	then	naturally,	mereological	sums	of	tropes	can	
occupy	space.	But	that	would	no	longer	offer	a	reductive	account	of	material	objects	in	
terms	of	something	that	is	not	material	objects.	It	would	just	offer	a	reductive	account	of	
some	material	objects	in	terms	of	others.	It	would	no	longer	attempt	to	assay	concrete	
particulars	in	terms	of	entities	from	a	different	ontological	category.	It	thus	would	not	
threaten	the	notion	that	material	objects	are	part	of	the	world’s	ontological	bedrock	–	part	
of	the	fundamental	furniture	of	reality.	
ge	
I	conclude	that	Premise	2	of	the	space-occupation	argument	cannot	be	seriously	challenged	
by	appealing	to	space-occupying	tropes,	at	least	not	if	mereological	bundle	theory	hopes	to	
assay	material	objects	in	terms	of	entities	that	are	not	material	objects.	What	about	
resisting	the	premise	through	appeal	to	space-occupying	universals?	Obviously,	ante	rem	
universals	by	definition	cannot	occupy	space;	but	perhaps	in	re	universals	may	be	allowed	
to	occupy	the	spaces	in	which	they	are	located?8		
	 I	think	the	distinctive	mode	of	being	that	in	re	universals	claim	for	themselves	
makes	this	exceedingly	difficult	to	envisage.	Recall	that	by	definition	in	re	universals	can	be	
wholly	present	in	different	places	at	the	same	time.	Now	suppose	for	reductio	the	
conjunction	of	the	following	two	claims:	(a)	brownness	is	wholly	present	in	different	places	
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at	the	same	time	and	(b)	brownness	occupies	the	space	in	which	it	is	present.	Then	since	
brownness	is	wholly	present	in	non-overlapping	regions	R	and	R*	at	the	same	time,	it	
occupies	in	its	entirety	both	R	and	R*	at	the	same	time.	For	instance,	brownness	in	its	
entirety	fills	up	the	region	occupied	by	my	desk.	The	whole	of	brownness	can	therefore	be	
found	in	this	region,	which	is	inside	my	office.	If	the	whole	of	x	can	be	found	in	some	region	
R	inside	my	office,	though,	then	presumably	none	of	x	can	be	found	to	fill	up	some	region	in	
my	neighbor’s	kitchen.	But	lo	and	behold,	in	this	case	it	turns	out	that	some	of	x	also	
occupies	some	portion	of	my	neighbor’s	kitchen’s	space,	namely,	the	portion	filled	by	his	
brown	cutting	board.	In	fact,	all	of	x	is	entirely	confined	to	the	neighbor’s	kitchen	–	while	at	
the	same	time	being	entirely	confined	to	my	office.	In	consequence,	and	given	that	the	
distance	between	my	office	and	my	neighbor’s	kitchen	is	exactly	one	mile,	we	can	say	that	
the	entity	we	are	interested	in	–	brownness	as	a	space-occupying	in	re	universal	–	lies	at	
exactly	one	mile	from	itself.		
	 To	be	clear,	I	am	not	claiming	to	fully	understand	what	the	last	few	sentences	are	
saying.	Rather,	I	am	claiming	that	these	are	some	of	the	sentences	we	would	need	to	
understand	in	order	to	make	sense	of	a	space-occupying	in	re	universal.	And	my	point	is	
not	simply	that	in	re	universals’	ability	to	be	wholly	present	in	different	places	at	the	same	
time	involves	certain	oddities	–	this	has	been	pointed	out	already	(see,	e.g.,	O’Leary-
Hawthorne	1995	on	immanent/in	re	universals’	non-zero	distance	from	themselves);	my	
point	is	rather	that	combining	these	oddities	with	the	notion	that	in	re	universals	occupy	
the	space	at	which	they	are	present	–	and	in	consequence	occupy	in	their	entirety	the	space	
at	which	they	are	wholly	present	–	makes	the	resulting	entities	scarcely	intelligible.9		
	 With	this	I	close	my	defense	of	Premise	2	of	the	space-occupation	argument.	Next	
we	take	up	the	defense	of	premise	3.		
	
4 Composition,	Fundamental	Science,	and	Fundamental	Ontology		
	
Might	there	be	something	about	the	operation	of	fusing	that	somehow	generates	the	space-
occupying	character	of	its	product?	It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	here	that	despite	the	
“productive”	sound	of	the	word	“fusing,”	all	it	means	in	the	mereological	context	is	
summing.	And	it	is	unclear	how	summation	could	radically	transform	the	nature	of	the	
items	summed.	Paul	is	not	confused	about	this:	
Do	not	be	tempted	by	the	fallacious	idea	that	fusing	is	what	somehow	‘makes’	the	ordinary	
object	.	.	.	chunky	or	substantial.	That’s	not	how	fusing	works:	it	makes	many	into	one,	it	
doesn’t	make	non-substances	into	substances	or	abstract	things	into	concrete	ones.	(2017a:	
42)	
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So	for	Paul,	denying	Premise	3	of	the	space-occupation	argument	is	a	non-starter.	
Nonetheless	we	should	consider	whether	someone	else	might	explore	this	way	of	defending	
mereological	bundle	theory.		
In	§2,	this	premise	was	presented,	basically,	as	an	a	priori	claim:	it	is	armchair	
reflection	which	instructs	that	mereological	summation	of	entities	that	do	not	occupy	space	
cannot	yield	an	entity	that	does	occupy	space.	But	a	mereological	bundle	theorist	might	
object	that	contemporary	physics	portrays	a	picture	of	the	material	world	where	tables	and	
flowers	are	ultimately	composed	of	entities	whose	relationship	to	spacetime	is	much	more	
ambiguous.	
	 ‘This	is	an	area	into	which	fools	rush	at	their	own	risk,’	warns	Simons	(1994:	569).	
Still,	some	superficial	remarks	may	prove	useful.	In	particular,	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	
while	contemporary	physics	offers	a	‘surprising’	portrait	of	the	fundamental	physical	
level(s),	no	evidence	can	be	found	in	contemporary	physics	that	fundamental	particles	do	
not	occupy	space.		
	 One	of	the	few	things	contemporary	physics	tells	us	clearly	is	that	tables	are	made	of	
elementary	particles.	In	particle	physics’	Standard	Model,	these	particles	are	of	two	kinds:	
(i)	fermions,	notably	electrons	and	up	and	down	quarks,	which	(very	roughly)	are	like	units	
of	matter,	and	(ii)	bosons,	such	as	photons,	which	(again	very	roughly)	mediate	interactions	
between	units	of	matter.	Now,	some	bosons	are	massless,	and	this	might	raise	the	suspicion	
that	they	do	not	occupy	space.	But	all	fermions	have	nonzero	mass,	and	this	ought	to	raise	
the	corresponding	suspicion	that	they	do	occupy	space.		
	 The	ontological	oddity	of	fermions	concerns	not	their	space-occupation	but	their	
individuality	(see	French	1989).	If	you	have	two	children,	the	probability	that	you	have	two	
daughters	is	.25,	the	probability	that	you	have	two	sons	is	.25,	and	the	probability	that	you	
have	one	daughter	and	one	son	is	.5.	The	reason	the	last	option	is	double	as	probable	is	that	
it	amalgamates	two	distinct	possibilities:	that	your	first	child	is	a	daughter	and	your	second	
a	son,	and	that	your	first	is	a	son	and	your	second	a	daughter.	Oddly,	this	is	not	how	things	
work	with	particles.	Suppose	you	have	two	particles	each	of	which	can	be	either	here	or	
there.	You	might	expect	a	similar	probability	distribution:	the	probability	that	both	are	
here	would	be	.25,	the	probability	that	both	are	there	would	be	.25,	and	the	probability	that	
one	is	here	and	one	is	there	would	be	.5.	But	in	quantum	mechanics,	the	three	scenarios	are	
assigned	equal	probability.	What	this	means	is	that	quantum	mechanics	does	not	recognize	
two	numerically	distinct	states	of	affairs,	one	where	particle	Jimmy	is	here	and	particle	
Johnny	is	there	and	another	where	Johnny	is	here	and	Jimmy	is	there.	And	if	there	is	no	
difference	between	the	states	of	affairs	of	x	being	in	L	and	y	being	in	L,	this	can	only	mean	
that	x	and	y	are	not	distinct	individuals.10		
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	 However,	note	that	these	legitimate	concerns	about	the	individuality	of	particles	do	
not	entail	anything	about	their	status	as	space-occupants.	Even	if	we	strip	the	two	fermions	
of	their	status	as	individuals	on	these	grounds,	it	does	not	follow	that	they	do	not	occupy	
space.	It	is	perhaps	indeterminate	whether	this	fermion	is	here	or	there,	but	either	way	it	
occupies	some	space	–	some	space	there	if	it	is	there,	some	space	here	if	it	is	here.		
One	way	to	think	of	the	philosophical	lesson	here	is	this:	What	quantum	mechanics	
brings	out	is	that	being	an	individual	requires	more	than	just	being	a	space-occupying	
concrete	particular;	it	requires	also	that	permutations	of	space-occupying	concrete	
particulars	could	constitute	distinct	states	of	affairs.	Because	some	particles	do	not	in	fact	
satisfy	this	additional	requirement,	they	do	not	qualify	as	individuals.	But	they	still	occupy	
space,	as	befits	their	status	as	concrete	particulars	and	indeed	as	material	objects.	
	 A	distinct	challenge	might	be	thought	to	hail	from	superstring	theory,	according	to	
which	tables	and	flowers	are	ultimately	made	of	one-dimensional	entities	interacting	
within	a	ten-dimensional	space.	Since	one-dimensional	entities	have	no	volume	and	so	do	
not	occupy	space,	superstring	theory	may	rightly	be	taken	to	imply	the	constitution	of	
space-occupiers	by	collections	of	non-space-occupiers.	The	problem,	however,	is	that	
superstring	theory	has	remained	resolutely	and	fantastically	evidence-free	for	over	four	
decades.	And	although	absence	of	evidence	is	not	evidence	of	absence	(at	least	in	
sufficiently	large-scale	systems),	the	fact	that	after	so	many	years	there	is	still	no	trace	of	
certain	particles	that	superstring	theory	must	hypothesize	in	order	to	work	has	led	many	
physicists	to	despair	of	it.	Given	this	predicament,	it	is	simply	false	that	superstring	theory	
offers	evidence	of	space-occupiers	built	out	of	non-space-occupiers.	What	it	offers	are	
elegant	speculations	to	that	effect.11		
ge	
The	last	move	I	want	to	explore	on	behalf	of	the	mereological	bundle	theorist	is	that	of	
retreating	from	the	thesis	that	material	objects	are	mereological	sums	of	properties	to	the	
more	fashionable-sounding	claim	that	mereological	sums	of	properties	ground	material	
objects.12	This	is	a	potentially	good	move,	as	the	grounding	of	space-occupiers	by	sums	of	
non-space-occupiers	is	not	as	immediately	suspicious	as	the	identity	of	space-occupiers	
with	sums	of	non-space-occupiers;	and	at	the	same	time,	if	material	objects	are	grounded	in	
sums	of	properties,	then	they	are	not	among	the	ungrounded	grounds	of	reality,	the	
fundamental	furniture	of	world.	
(This	dialectical	situation	has	a	certain	historical	precedent.	Leibniz	scholars	have	
been	confronted	with	an	interpretive	conundrum	due	to	passages	in	which	Leibniz	seems	
to	equate	bodies	with	aggregates	of	monads.	Given	that	monads	are	immaterial	and	bodies	
material,	the	notion	that	aggregates	of	the	former	could	constitute	the	latter	has	perplexed	
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interpreters.	The	going	interpretive	hypothesis	is	that	Leibniz	could	not	possibly	hold	that	
bodies	are	aggregates	of	monads,	and	must	therefore	have	had	in	mind	that	they	rather	
result,	or	emerge,	from	monads	–	see,	e.g.,	Jolley	2005:	77.	Clearly,	Leibniz	scholars	think	
that	identifying	bodies	with	monad-aggregates	is	too	elementary	a	mistake	to	attribute	to	
Leibniz.	Some	ontological	daylight	must	be	introduced	between	the	two,	though	without	
compromising	the	basic	thought	that	the	existence	of	bodies	ontologically	depends	on	the	
existence	of	monads.)	
	 What	are	we	to	make	of	such	a	ground-theoretic	mereological	bundle	theory?	There	
is	no	question,	of	course,	that	it	affords	extra	room	for	maneuver.	Still,	there	are	two	
features	commonly	(though	not	universally)	attributed	to	grounding	that	should	give	us	
pause,	suggesting	that	a	space-occupier	could	not	in	fact	be	grounded	in	a	sum	of	entities	
none	of	which	occupies	space.	
The	first	feature	is	that	grounding	is	supposed	to	undergird	explanation	(Fine	2001:	
15):	if	x	grounds	y,	then	y	admits	of	a	certain	type	of	distinctively	metaphysical	explanation	
in	terms	of	x.13	We	understand	why	{Socrates}	exists	when	informed	that	Socrates	exists,	
we	understand	why	the	desk	is	brown	when	informed	that	it	is	sienna-brown,	and	so	on.	
Accordingly,	if	the	ground-theoretic	mereological	bundle	theory	is	true,	then	we	should	be	
able	to	explain	the	fact	that	there	is	a	table	here	in	terms	of	the	fact	that	properties	F1,	…	,	Fn	
are	mereologically	fused	here.	We	should	be	able	to	understand	why	there	is	a	table	here	
given	that	the	right	fusion	of	properties	occurs	here.	However,	if	the	space-occupation	
argument	is	sound,	this	is	not	at	all	the	case.	If	the	table	occupies	some	space	and	none	of	
the	properties	does,	we	cannot	in	fact	see	why	there	should	be	a	table	here	given	that	there	
is	the	fusion	of	properties	here.	On	the	contrary,	we	are	faced	with	a	clear	explanatory	gap:	
it	is	mysterious	how	a	space-occupying	entity	could	arise	from	the	coming-together	of	so	
many	non-space-occupying	entities.	What	this	suggests	is	that	the	retreat	to	a	ground-
theoretic	version	of	mereological	bundle	theory	is	only	helpful	if	we	can	independently	
overcome	the	space-occupation	argument.	But	if	we	can,	of	course,	retreat	becomes	
unnecessary.		
	 A	second	central	feature	of	grounding	is	that	it	casts	the	grounded	as	nothing	over	
and	above	the	ground	(Rosen	2010:	§10),	where	this	implies	that	adding	grounded	entities	
to	one’s	ontology	does	not	worsen	one’s	ontological	debit	score	(Schaffer	2015).	Add	up	the	
costs	of	all	the	ungrounded	entities	in	a	certain	theory	of	the	world,	and	you	have	the	full	
ontological	cost	of	the	theory.	This	feature	of	grounding	suggests	that	grounded	entities	
cannot	be	profoundly,	categorically	different	from	grounds.	For	adding	categorically	
different	entities	to	one’s	ontology	should	affect	the	theory’s	ontological	cost.	But	now	
consider:	if	you	start	out	with	an	ontology	in	which	nothing	occupies	any	space,	and	then	
decide	to	add	to	it	entities	the	very	mode	of	being	of	which	is	to	occupy	space,	this	seems	
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intuitively	like	a	substantive	addition	that	ought	to	affect	the	ontological	cost	of	your	
overall	theory.		
	 These	considerations	suggest	to	me	that	the	retreat	from	an	identity	to	a	grounding	
formulation	holds	no	genuine	promise	for	the	mereological	bundle	theory	of	material	
objects.	In	particular,	as	long	as	the	mereological	bundle	theorist	has	not	explained	how	
summing	non-space-occupiers	could	yield	a	space-occupying	entity,	the	resulting	
explanatory	gap	undermines	a	grounding	connection.	This	concludes	my	defense	of	
Premise	3	of	the	space-occupation	argument,	and	thus	of	the	argument	as	a	whole.		
	
Conclusion	
	
The	argument	of	this	paper	is	at	bottom	simple:	properties	do	not	occupy	space	whereas	
material	objects	do,	and	summing	entities	that	do	not	occupy	space	cannot	magically	
secrete	anything	that	does	occupy	space.	This	argument’s	conclusion	is	admittedly	entirely	
negative,	but	it	aliments	a	suspicion	more	positive	in	character:	namely,	that	material	
objects,	being	uniquely	space-occupying,	cannot	be	‘built	up’	from	any	other	types	of	
entities	and	must	consequently	be	taken	as	part	of	the	fundamental	furniture	of	the	world.	
For	any	attempt	to	anchor	the	existence	of	material	objects	in	more	fundamental	entities	
would	run	into	the	following	dilemma:	either	those	putative	fundamentals	would	not	
occupy	space,	in	which	case	it	would	be	unclear	how	they	could	underlie	the	existence	of	
material	objects;	or	they	would	occupy	space,	in	which	case	it	would	be	unclear	why	they	
are	not	themselves	material	objects.	Either	way,	it	would	seem	that	space-occupying	
entities	must	be	posited	as	part	of	the	fundamental	make-up	of	reality.14	
	 To	say	that	material	objects	are	part	of	the	fundamental	furniture	of	the	world	is	not	
to	say	that	all	of	them	are:	the	existence	of	some	material	objects	may	well	be	grounded	in	
that	of	other	material	objects.	Still,	the	category	of	material	object	would	have	to	be	
considered	fundamental,	insofar	as	some	material	objects	would	be	among	the	ungrounded	
grounds	of	reality.	This	is	consistent	with	either	(a)	a	polycategorial	ontology	that	admits	
properties	and	perhaps	other	entities	alongside	material	objects	or	(b)	a	monocategorial	
ontology	in	which	properties	and	other	entities	are	‘built	up	from’	material	objects.	My	own	
sympathies	lie	with	(b)	–	essentially,	a	form	of	what	has	historically	been	called	
‘nominalism’	(see	Kriegel	2021)	–	but	that	goes	far	beyond	what	I	have	tried	to	argue	for	
here.	The	argument	here	was	that	mereological	bundle	theory	cannot	work	until	an	
account	is	provided	of	how	space-occupying	entities	may	be	‘generated’	by	the	summation	
of	non-space-occupying	entities.15	
	 18	
	
	
References	
§ Armstrong,	D.M.	1978.	Universals	and	Scientific	Realism	(2	Vol.).	Cambridge:	Cambridge	UP.		
§ Armstrong,	D.M.	1997.	A	World	of	States	of	Affairs.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	UP.	
§ Baker,	L.R.	1997.	‘Why	Constitution	is	not	Identity.’	Journal	of	Philosophy	94:	599–621.	
§ Bealer,	G.	1993.	‘Universals.’	Journal	of	Philosophy	60:	5-32.	
§ Bennett,	K.	2004.	Spatio-Temporal	Coincidence	and	the	Grounding	Problem.	Philosophical	
Studies	118:	339-371.	
§ Black,	M.	1952.	‘The	Identity	of	Indiscernibles.’	Mind	61:	153-164.	
§ Campbell,	K.	1981.	‘The	Metaphysic	of	Abstract	Particulars.’	Midwest	Studies	in	Philosophy	6:	
477-488.	
§ Campbell,	K.	1990.	Abstract	Particulars.	Oxford	and	Cambridge,	MA:	Basil	Blackwell.	
§ Contoir,	A.J.	and	D.L.M.	Baxter	(eds.)	2014.	Composition	as	Identity.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.		
§ Erismann,	C.	2014.	‘Explaining	Exact	Resemblance:	Gilbert	of	Poitiers’s	Conformitas	Theory	
Reconsidered.’	Oxford	Studies	in	Medieval	Philosophy	2:	1-24.	
§ Fairchild,	M.	2019.	‘The	Barest	Flutter	of	the	Smallest	Leaf:	Understanding	Material	
Plenitude.’	Philosophical	Review	128:	143-178.	
§ Fine,	K.	2001.	‘The	Question	of	Realism.’	Philosophers’	Imprint	1	(1):	1-30.	
§ Fine,	K.	2003.	‘The	Non-Identity	of	a	Material	Thing	and	Its	Matter.’	Mind	112:	195-234.	
§ French,	S.	1989.	‘Identity	and	Individuality	in	Classical	and	Quantum	Physics.’	Australasian	
Journal	of	Philosophy	67:	432-446.	
§ Giberman,	D.	2014.	‘Tropes	in	Space.’	Philosophical	Studies	167:	453-472.	
§ Gilmore,	C.S.	2003.	‘In	Defence	of	Spatially	Related	Universals.’	Australasian	Journal	of	
Philosophy	81:	420-428.	
§ Goodman,	N.	1951.	The	Structure	of	Appearances.	Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	UP.		
§ Hoffman,	J.	and	G.S	Rosenkrantz	1994.	Substance	among	Other	Categories.	Cambridge:	
Cambridge	UP.		
§ Hume,	D.	1739-40.	A	Treatise	of	Human	Nature.	London:	John	Noone.	
§ Jolley,	N.	2005.	Leibniz.	London	and	New	York:	Routledge.	
§ Kriegel,	U.	2021.	‘Nominalism	and	Material	Plenitude.’	Res	Philosophica	98:	91-114.		
§ Ladyman,	J.	and	D.	Ross	2007.	Every	Thing	Must	Go:	Metaphysics	Naturalized.	Oxford:	Oxford	
UP.	
§ Leslie,	S-J.	2011.	‘Essentialism,	Plenitude,	and	Paradox.’	Philosophical	Perspectives	25:	277-
296.	
§ Leslie,	S-J.	and	A.	Lerner	2016.	‘Generic	Generalizations.’	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy.		
§ Markosian,	N.	1998.	‘Brutal	Composition.’	Philosophical	Studies	92:	211-249.	
§ O’Leary-Hawthorne,	J.	1995.	‘The	Bundle	Theory	of	Substance	and	the	Identity	of	
Indiscernibles.’	Analysis	55:	191-196.	
	 19	
§ Paul,	L.A.	2002.	‘Logical	Parts.’	Noûs	36:	578-596.	
§ Paul,	L.A.	2006.	‘Coincidence	as	Overlap.’	Noûs	40:	623-659.	
§ Paul,	L.A.	2017a.	‘A	One	Category	Ontology.’	In	J.A.	Keller	(ed.),	Being,	Freedom,	and	Method.	
New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
§ Paul,	L.A.	2017b.	‘Mereological	Bundle	Theory.’	In	H.	Burkhardt,	J.	Seibt,	and	G.	Imaguire	
(eds.),	Handbook	of	Mereology.	Munich:	Philosophia	Verlag.			
§ Rosen,	G.	2010.	‘Metaphysical	Dependence:	Grounding	and	Reduction.’	In	B.	Hale	and	A.	
Hoffman	(eds.),	Modality:	Metaphysics,	Logic,	and	Epistemology.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.	
§ Rosen,	G.	2017.	‘Abstract	Objects.’	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy.	
§ Russell,	B.	1950.	An	Inquiry	into	Meaning	and	Truth.	London:	Routledge,	1995.	
§ Schaffer,	J.	2015.	‘What	Not	to	Multiply	without	Necessity.’	Australasian	Journal	of	
Philosophy	93:	644-664.	
§ Simons,	P.	1994.	‘Particulars	in	Particular	Clothing.’	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	
Research	54:	553-575.	
§ Skyrms,	B.	1981.	‘Tractarian	Nominalism.’	Philosophical	Studies	40:	199-206.	
§ Van	Cleve,	J.	1985.	‘Three	Versions	of	the	Bundle	Theory.’	Philosophical	Studies	47:	95-107.	
§ Van	Inwagen,	P.	1990.	Material	Beings.	Ithaca:	Cornell	UP.		
§ Williams,	D.C.	1953.	‘On	the	Elements	of	Being:	I.’	Review	of	Metaphysics	7:	3-18.	
	
	
	
                                                
1	I	use	the	term	‘entity’	not	for	concrete	particulars	but	in	the	most	generic	way	possible,	to	stand	
for	the	ontological	summum	genus.	
	
2	There	is	another	strand	in	trope	theory	that	construes	abstractness	as	a	certain	type	of	
incompleteness	–	tropes	are	abstract	because	they	are	only	fragments	of	being.	However,	as	Donald	
Williams	himself	noted,	strictly	speaking	this	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	‘everything	but	the	World	
All	is	abstract	in	this	broad	sense’	(1953:	14).	
	
3	Typically,	generics	are	produced	with	so-called	bare	plurals,	as	in	‘Dogs	have	four	legs.’	The	fact	
that	some	dogs	are	three-legged	makes	the	universally	quantified	claim	‘All	dogs	are	four-legged’	
false,	but	depending	on	how	many	and	which	dogs	are	three-legged,	the	fact	that	some	dogs	are	
three-legged	is	consistent	with	the	truth	of	the	generic	‘Dogs	are	four-legged.’	What	the	correct	
semantics	for	generics	is	is	a	lively	area	of	debate	in	both	linguistics	and	philosophy	(see	Leslie	and	
Lerner	2016);	we	need	not	take	a	stand	on	it	here.	
	
4	Some	attempts	to	address	the	insubstantiality	worry	may	manage	to	address	other	aspects	of	
what	we	expect	substances	to	be	like,	but	fail	to	recover	this	aspect	of	concreteness.	Simons	(1994),	
for	instance,	attempts	to	recover	existential	independence	of	substances	within	a	trope-bundle	
framework.	Even	if	Simons	succeeded,	however,	this	would	not	yet	capture	the	aspect	of	space-
occupation.	
	
5	Consider	for	example	the	option	of	interpreting	bundle	theory	as	holding	that	objects	turn	out	to	
be	really	just	complex	properties.	(This	is	an	odd	way	to	interpret	bundle	theory,	since	there	is	no	
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role	for	bundling	in	it	at	all,	but	let	us	bracket	that	issue.)	If	the	thought	is	that	reflection	on	the	very	
notion	of	a	material	object	instructs	us	that	there	is	no	object-property	dichotomy	because	the	
notion	of	an	object	is	really	just	the	notion	of	a	complex	property,	this	is	certainly	false.	The	very	
subject-predicate	structure	of	our	language	and	thought	indicate	clearly	a	presumption	of	
dichotomy.	If	the	thought	is	instead	that	ontological	investigation	instructs	us	that	the	ultimate	
nature	of	objects	is	just	the	nature	of	complex	properties,	this	would	be	more	plausible	but	would	
run	straight	into	the	problem	raised	by	the	space-occupation	argument:	if	a	material	object	
occupies	space,	whereas	a	complex	property	does	not,	it	is	unclear	how	they	could	share	a	nature.		
	
6	More	recently,	Giberman	(2014)	has	proposed	an	account	of	tropes	that	casts	them	as	space-
occupying	entities.	However,	Giberman’s	idea	of	a	trope	is	highly	heterodox,	insofar	as	he	
understands	tropes	to	be	not	abstract	particulars	but	concrete	particulars	(2014:	455).	This	
construal	suggests	that	the	kind	of	entity	he	has	in	mind	is	very	different	from	the	kind	of	entity	
most	trope	theorists	have	had	in	mind.	I	will	return	to	the	possibility	of	construing	tropes	as	
concrete	particulars	at	the	end	of	my	discussion	of	Campbell.		
	
7	Campbell	himself	does	not	seem	to	take	a	stand	on	this.	Giberman	(2014)	appears	to	construe	
tropes	along	the	(b)	option.	
	
8	This	would	make	them	concrete	universals,	as	opposed	to	the	abstract	universals	they	are	typically	
taken	to	be.	Trope	theorists	also	allowed	for	entities	they	called	concrete	universals,	but	they	had	in	
mind	something	quite	different:	properties	such	as	being	Socrates	and	being	Quine.		
	
9	In	a	different	but	somewhat	related	context,	Cody	Gilmore	(2003)	has	proposed	that	apparent	
two-place	spatial	relations,	such	as	‘x	is	a	mile	from	y,’	are	in	reality	four-place	relations,	in	this	case	
‘x	in	location	Lx	is	a	mile	from	y	in	location	Ly.’	It	is	not	clear	how	to	apply	this	to	‘x	is	a	mile	from	x’	
(where	this	does	not	mean	‘a	part	of	x	is	a	mile	from	another	part	of	x’).	But	even	if	we	knew	how	to	
apply	it,	a	bundle	theorist	could	not	make	use	of	it	unless,	as	noted	in	§1,	she	could	identify	
locations	independently	of	objects	–	which	she	may	not	wish	to	do.		
	
10	This	phenomenon	sometimes	inspires	the	kind	of	‘ontic	structural	realism’	according	to	which	
the	only	entities	that	are	real	at	the	fundamental	physical	level	are	the	relations	between	particles,	
such	as	the	distance	between	the	particle	here	and	the	particle	there	(Ladyman	and	Ross	2007).	
Sometimes	the	view	goes	as	far	as	to	deny	that	there	are	really	particles	which	serve	as	relata,	
sometimes	it	states	(more	modestly)	that	the	particles	exist	but	only	as	junctures	in	a	web	of	
relations,	hence	as	derivative	rather	than	fundamental	entities.		
	
11	The	attraction	of	superstring	theory,	it	is	worth	noting,	is	mostly	armchair-ish.	The	motivation	for	
it	has	to	do	with	a	certain	disunity	in	our	fundamental	understanding	of	the	universe,	namely,	the	
fact	that	of	four	fundamental	forces	current	physics	posits,	three	are	accounted	for	beautifully	by	
quantum	mechanics	but	the	fourth	(gravity)	eludes	quantum-mechanical	explanation.	Superstring	
theory	offers	an	elegantly	unified	treatment	of	all	four	forces,	but	as	noted	it	suffers	from	complete	
absence	of	empirical	evidence.	
	
12	Typically,	the	relevant	notion	of	grounding	is	construed	as	primitive	and	unanalyzable,	picking	
out	a	sui	generis	asymmetric	non-causal	determination	relation	between	facts,	in	which	the	
fundament	is	ontologically	prior	to	the	terminus	(Fine	2001).	
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13	There	are	many	debates	about	the	nature	of	the	relevant	kind	of	explanation,	as	well	as	on	its	
precise	relationship	to	grounding.	I	bracket	these	debates	here,	hoping	the	point	I	want	to	make	is	
neutral	on	them.		
	
14	Alternatively,	the	very	existence	of	material	objects	could	be	denied.	This	would	of	course	be	a	
much	more	radical	view	(though	certainly	one	defended	by	some	metaphysicians,	e.g.	Ladyman	and	
Ross	2007),	and	not	one	in	which	sums	of	properties	are	used	to	account	for	material	objects.	This	
view	is	not	subject	to	the	space-occupation	argument,	since	as	noted	my	target	is	only	views	on	
which	material	objects	can	be	assayed	in	terms	of	bundles	of	properties,	not	views	on	which	there	
are	no	material	objects.	
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